The Horn: Walking a Tightrope between Own, External Interests

Amb.ZerihunAbebe, Ethiopia’s African Affairs director at MFA on the Horn’s geopolitics 

ZerihunAbebe(Ambassador) isa veteran diplomatand seasoned negotiator with extensive experience in regional diplomacy and strategic affairs.Currently, he is serving as Director General for African Affairs at Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

Prior to his appointments, Zerihun has conducted intensive researches in transboundary resources, Nile Basin Hydro-politics.Healso taught at Dilla University, before joining the diplomatic corps. Throughout his diplomatic career, Zerihun served in Ethiopian embassies in Nairobi, London, Khartoum, and Dakar- focusing on political affairs, regional integration, and strategic partnerships.

Notably, during his tenure as Director for Transboundary Resources Affairs at MFA, Ambassador Zerihun played a prominent role in diplomatic negotiations and policy formulation surrounding the Nile River and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). He is widely recognized for his deep expertise on Horn of Africa affairs, hydro-diplomacy, and cooperation over transboundary water resources.

In this interview with The Reporter’sNardosYoseph, Ambassador Zerihun dismisses claims alleging ‘Ethiopia’s pursuit of sea access and naval base as a threat to regional stability’, as a “mistaken conclusion”. He argues that while global powers thousands of miles away freely establish military bases on the coasts of Horn countries, denying a nation of 130 million people located barely 60 kilometers from red-sea coastline as ‘illegitimate’; is both irrational and unjust. Attempting to suppress a fair and inevitable demand, risks creating future instability, he warns. Instead, he advocates for shared development frameworks — including regional gateway infrastructure projects in East Africa — as the sustainable path forward, rather than dwelling on historical grievances.

Beyond Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions, the conversation delves into strategic autonomy among the Horn nations, domestic vulnerabilities, proxy conflicts, external influences, the Red Sea corridor geopolitics, Ethiopia’s need of port diversification further than dependence on Djibouti port, and the pressures created by the region’s immense strategic values. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: What ‘strategic autonomy’ denotes in the context of the Horn of Africa?

Zerihun (Ambassador): Strategic autonomy is fundamentally a diplomatic concept. Countries naturally interact with one another, but the key issue is whether those interactions are driven by their own national interests or interests imposed upon them by more powerful states. Strategic autonomy means ensuring that countries in the region make decisions based on their own priorities and sovereignty, rather than becoming instruments for advancing external agendas.

This does not mean disengaging from international relations. Engagement is inevitable. However, such relationships should not undermine sovereignty or erode political independence. Regional states must preserve the ability to make decisions according to their own interests.

How can this be understood in practical terms, and how would you assess the Horn of Africa from this perspective?

If we look broadly, for a long time much of the Western world aligned itself closely with the United States, often following Washington’s lead almost automatically. But Europe increasingly began reassessing its own interests and prioritizing what serves Europe first. Where its interests align with America’s, cooperation continues. Where they diverge, Europe pursues its own path.

The same logic applies to East Africa. Our region hosts many external actors — Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the European Union, the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and others. The question is whether countries in the Horn are engaging these powers while protecting their own interests, or whether they are simply serving as extensions of foreign agendas.

What strategies should countries adopt to protect their national interests? How do you assess the capacity of countries in the region to do so?

Generally speaking, states tend to follow four possible approaches. The first is indifference — pretending global developments do not concern them. I compare this to an ostrich burying its head in the sand.

The second is simply moving with the wind, without any clear position or guiding principle.

The third is attaching oneself permanently to one bloc or camp — East or West, ideological or political — and remaining confined within that alignment.

The fourth, and the correct approach, is pursuing national interest while preserving political independence. That means engaging all actors while firmly safeguarding the pillars of national security and sovereignty. This is what strategic autonomy truly means.

What we observed during this week’s Jijiga Forum is that the Horn of Africa has long been vulnerable to external influence. Since the 1960s and 1970s, the region has served as a major theater for proxy wars. During the Cold War, it became an arena for competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, later joined by China and, more recently, various middle powers pursuing their own interests. The region has effectively become a geopolitical playground for external actors.

Why has the region become so vulnerable to outside influence, and what are the possible solutions?

First, internal vulnerability. Many countries in the region remain economically weak. Second, security fragility. Internal conflicts, governance problems, and instability create openings for external actors to intervene and manipulate situations for their own benefit.

Third, there is the issue of global competition driven by the region’s strategic importance. The Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the western Indian Ocean are all located here. Around 12 percent of global trade — estimated at roughly one trillion dollars — passes through the Red Sea alone.Between 19,000 and 26,000 vessels pass through the Red Sea annually, according to IMF maritime data and the Suez Canal Authority. But this figure is halved since the conflict along the red-sea international trade corridor.

 Naturally, this attracts powers seeking military bases, port access, and strategic leverage.

At the same time, the region possesses immense natural resources: water, agricultural land, oil, natural gas, lithium, phosphate, and more. Competing powers want access to these resources. Without strategic autonomy, the Horn risks becoming merely a servant of external interests rather than a defender of its own.

That is why regional countries must protect their political independence and ensure that their own interests guide their policies. Equally important is solving our own problems ourselves. If we fail to address our own challenges, others will step in to speak on our behalf and impose solutions. Our affairs will increasingly be discussed in external forums — whether in Arab platforms, European institutions, or elsewhere — rather than within the region itself.

The solution is for countries in the Horn to engage one another directly, resolve both domestic and regional disputes collectively, and cooperate in ways that genuinely protect shared regional interests.

Some scholars argue that, compared to traditional Western powers or even the emerging Middle Eastern and other new powers attempting to expand their influence in the region, it may be more beneficial for the Horn of Africa to work with countries like China whose engagement is primarily economically driven. What is your view on this?

One of the four ways countries protect their interests is by pursuing partnerships that best serve their national benefit. Every country assesses for itself who it can work with to maximize its interests. At the same time, we also have to examine what interests those major powers — whether global superpowers or regional powers — themselves have in the Horn of Africa.

So the responsibility of balancing these relationships first lies with each sovereign state individually, and secondly with the countries of the region collectively in determining whether acting together serves them better.

In simple terms, what does this region need most? This region needs economic development. The region possesses natural resources, a young and energetic population, water, land, gold, and many kinds of minerals. What the region needs are actors that help translate these resources into development through infrastructure, technology transfer, and cooperation — not actors that enter the region to destabilize it. The region benefits more from working with partners based on mutual benefit and shared development principles.

That does not mean the region must align itself permanently with one bloc. On one issue, a country may find it advantageous to cooperate more closely with one actor, while on another issue it may work with someone else. This is exactly what we mean by strategic autonomy.

If we truly believe we possess strategic decision-making independence and capacity, then we should not be forced into following a single country or bloc. Nor do we owe explanations to external actors for decisions made on the basis of our own national interests. Clarifying misunderstandings is one thing, but constantly justifying sovereign decisions as though we are subordinates would amount to surrendering our independence. That is why caution is necessary.

Some observers argue that interactions among countries in the Horn of Africa — whether with neighbors or external powers — are often guided by the principle that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Do you agree?

I do not think that approach works for this region. The Horn of Africa is deeply interconnected through culture, religion, history, geography, ecology, and natural resources. If one country allies with another simply to attack a third party, eventually the very weapon it throws may turn back against itself. History has shown us this repeatedly.

We have seen countries that once collaborated against Ethiopia eventually descend into severe internal divisions, conflict, stagnation, and instability themselves. Some have fallen so far behind in development and governance that their condition resembles something from centuries ago rather than the modern era. What does this teach us? It shows that the region needs a new vision, a new approach, and a new way of thinking.

That new vision begins by identifying our shared interests and shared threats. The countries of the Horn are not identical; diversity exists in language, culture, political systems, and social structures. But within that diversity there are also common interests.

Ultimately, what do the peoples of this region want? First and foremost, is peace. Peace means a mother knowing her child can leave home and return safely. It means a teacher being able to work safely, and farmers and pastoralists being able to cultivate their land and graze their livestock without fear. It means people living and moving freely without anxiety.

After peace comes development — the ability to eat, dress, prosper, and improve one’s standard of living. Competition among countries is natural and inevitable. The real question is how we manage that competition. If any country believes its own prosperity depends on the failure or collapse of another, that approach will ultimately fail because the other side will not remain passive forever.

That is why we argue that cooperation in this region offers a better path. Through mutual benefit and collective engagement, it is possible to build a more stable and prosperous future. There are already platforms that can serve as foundations for such cooperation.

What practical mechanisms can help countries in the region work together more effectively? And what challenges might stand in the way?

There are regional frameworks capable of turning these aspirations into reality. One example is the Horn of Africa Gateway Development Projects, which have recently begun taking shape with international support. These initiatives focus on expanding development corridors linking Ethiopia with Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan.

Such corridors bring development and create employment opportunities for young people. They also reduce the space available for extremist groups or actors seeking to fuel conflict in the region.

However, achieving this requires patience and long-term effort because the region also carries historical grievances, misunderstandings, conflicts, and deep-rooted hostilities. Overcoming these challenges requires social justice and dialogue platforms that encourage listening and engagement.

For example, the recent Jijiga Forum brought together intellectuals and elites from four countries in what was arguably a first-of-its-kind regional dialogue. During the discussions, many grievances and frustrations were openly expressed. That in itself is an important mechanism. It helps reshape mindsets and opens doors for changing perceptions.

Elites play a critical role in shaping societies. If intellectuals and influential figures can reach understanding, that can pave the way for political settlements and help guide societies toward peace. By using such forums effectively, the region can prioritize development, peace, and a brighter future over historical resentment and hostility.

This region possesses enough resources not only to sustain itself but also to contribute beyond its borders.

There are arguments that economic integration in the Horn of Africa is often driven more by political calculations than by genuine economic logic. For example, some allege that   Ethiopia conducts most of its import and export trade through Djibouti because of political calculations and ask why has it not diversified more aggressively toward other neighboring ports? Do you think Ethiopia’s economic integration efforts primarily shaped by political interests?

No. Ethiopia’s use of Djibouti’s port is primarily a matter of convenience, logistics, and financial practicality. Other ports in the region are either not sufficiently developed or are geographically farther from Ethiopia’s economic center.

Transport and logistics are determined by factors such as distance, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and operational convenience. That does not mean Djibouti is perfect or entirely free of inefficiencies and challenges. The sector has its own limitations.

At the same time, Ethiopia’s economy is growing rapidly, and both imports and exports are expanding significantly. Because of this growth, port diversification is becoming inevitable — whether we actively pursue it or not. Expanding access to multiple ports is a natural development.

Djibouti became the primary option because it emerged earlier as the most viable and practical route. But that does not mean it can indefinitely meet all of Ethiopia’s expanding demands and capacities. As Ethiopia’s needs grow, so too must its connectivity and access routes.

Other regional ports are still developing and currently lack the capacity to fully accommodate Ethiopia’s growing logistical demands. That does not mean Ethiopia ignores them. We already use various ports at different levels, and that engagement will continue to expand over time.

The Horn of Africa region is often described by various actors as a theater for proxy wars. Why has this become the case? In your assessment, why has the region failed to free itself from proxy conflicts?

The problems of this region have political, social, economic, and security-related aspects. Broadly, we can divide them into three categories.

The first concerns the deep internal problems within the Horn’s individual countries. These include issues related to good governance and identity-based politics. Although these are domestic matters, they carry broad regional implications. There are unresolved historical grievances; questions related to religion, ethnicity, identity, language, social justice, economic inclusion, and security concerns — the feeling that “my security is not guaranteed” or even “I am being pushed toward extinction.”

Combined with this internal vulnerability is underdevelopment, which has exposed young people to extremism. Militias are being organized on a large scale, and due to a destructive political culture, there are movements that seek to seize power through force. There is a mentality that says, “If I cannot hold power, let the country perish.” This is evident whether it is in the activities of the TPLF,protracted war in Sudan, and in the conflict between Al-Shabaab and the Somalia federal government, among others. Even countries that appear outwardly peaceful often have internal tensions simmering beneath the surface. This is the first category of problems — the internal crisis within states.

The second category involves problems between countries. These include disputes over natural resources, border-related conflicts, and mistrust rooted in historical grievances. Such mistrust has produced a mentality where countries believe they can advance only by weakening one another.

The third category is external interference. Because of the first two issues — internal instability and inter-state conflict — countries interfere in one another’s affairs. External actors see this instability and think they can “fish in troubled waters.” Some wish to control the region because of their strategic interests, believing they can secure those interests by keeping the region unstable. Others import rivalries from entirely different regions into the Horn of Africa. As a result, the region remains increasingly destabilized.

The reason why is, because this region holds enormous geostrategic importance. It is valuable and strategically significant. There are actors who believe the only way to control the region is by destabilizing it. Egypt, for example, views Ethiopia’s destabilization as necessary for safeguarding its own development interests. As a result, it tries to contain Ethiopia from various directions. But such efforts are futile. Direct confrontations did not bore fruits a hundred years ago, nor today, and it will not succeed tomorrow either. What the region must understand is that instead of deepening divisions, we should come together and engage in dialogue.

At present, some argue that one of the main issues making countries in the region increasingly vulnerable to external pressure and proxy wars is Ethiopia’s intensified pursuit of sea access, particularly its interest in establishing a naval base. A number of regional countries openly criticize Ethiopia’s ambitions. On the other hand, there are also voices in Ethiopia arguing that some of the same countries that once cooperated with Egypt to pressure Ethiopia during the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) should not lecture Ethiopia now against establishing a naval base. How do you assess these two competing perspectives? And amid such opposing positions, how can countries in the region work together for their common interests? What is your view on this?

Given all the challenges and problems I mentioned earlier, to claim that the region’s instability and proxy wars are caused simply because Ethiopia asked for secure access to the sea, is wrong. The attempt to dump every existing regional problem onto a singleissue,is completely unacceptable.

The real question should look deeper than the surface. Ethiopia is a country with 130 million population size. It has legitimate national security concerns and enormous economic interests. Ethiopia sits only sixty kilometers away from the sea and historically had maritime access. But today, its import and export trade faces severe constraints. It also has significant political interests. At a time when this region is becoming increasingly militarized and securitized, it is shameful to tell Ethiopia — that the issue of sea access does not concern it.

What Ethiopia lost in the past was due to ignorance, shortsightedness, and negligence. To say Ethiopia has no right to raise the issue of sea access now, is disgraceful. That is genuinely how I see it.

Why? Number of countries including the United States has traveled thousands of miles to establish a presence in Djibouti. Japan has done the same. European countries are there. Turkey is in Mogadishu. India is present in this region. China and Italy are also active here. So to tell Ethiopia — located just sixty kilometers away — that it should not concern itself with maritime security, is simply ignorance.

Ethiopia’s entire import and export trade depends on the Red Sea corridor. No country has a greater stake in the security of these waters than Ethiopia. It has 130 million people, and its economic interests are inseparable from its national security interests. And I say this without even mentioning the size of Ethiopia’s maritime trade fleet.

If Ethiopia’s demand for fair and secure sea access is not addressed properly and justly, what danger does that pose for the region? This should be the real question.

When Eritrea federated with Ethiopia in 1950, one of the core parameters was the peace and stability of East Africa. To believe that the Horn of Africa region can remain peaceful while suppressing Ethiopia’s national interest in sea access, is a mistake. Maybe not today, but one day, this issue could explode.

Instead, what is needed is a comprehensive regional vision — one that seeks to address Ethiopia’s legitimate, fair, and rational demands in a way that benefits everyone, safeguards the interests of all parties, and promotes regional peace, development, and prosperity. Under such visionary collaborative approach, Ethiopia’s concerns would be addressed, and the region’s broader concerns also would be resolved.

المصدر: The Reporter (Ethiopia)