Will Zimbabwe’s lithium strategy help it break into the value-adding game?

The stakes are high given Zimbabwe supplied 1.13 million tonnes of lithium spodumene concentrate to China last year, accounting for roughly 15 per cent of its total lithium concentrate imports.

Carlos Lopes, a professor at the University of Cape Town’s Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, said the export was significant because it signalled a psychological and political break from the old extractive compact where Africa exported geology and imported dependency.

“What matters here is less the product itself than the direction of travel: Zimbabwe is effectively saying that the age of raw mineral evacuation must give way to negotiated industrial participation,” he said.

Lopes added that Beijing understood this dynamic well, as its engagement with Africa had always been tied to long-term industrial ecosystems, logistics corridors and market positioning rather than pure commodity access.

However, he warned that a lithium sulphate plant without downstream chemical capacity, grid reliability and regional integration risked becoming just a higher rung on the same extractive ladder.

“Africa must avoid becoming a refinery belt for other people’s industrial revolutions,” Lopes added.

Kai Xue, a Beijing-based corporate lawyer who advises on foreign direct investment and cross-border financing, suggested the situation offered a compromise where “everyone ends up with half of a loaf”.

While Zimbabwe secured its position as a midstream producer, Chinese firms guaranteed a reliable supply, though both carried costs.

Xue said Chinese firms must invest more capital, while Zimbabwe risked becoming less competitive than nations like Chile, which had premier resources but had been slower to roll out its own national lithium strategy, potentially diverting some capital away from Harare.

“Zimbabwe’s demands will drive some investment that it could have had to other lithium producing countries,” he said.

Linda Calabrese, a senior research fellow at ODI, the London-based global think tank, agreed that exporting a processed intermediate rather than raw material was a milestone, though she noted the processing itself remained relatively simple.

“The higher-value steps still happen overseas, almost entirely in China,” she said.

Nevertheless, Calabrese said, resource bans were stimulating rather than deterring foreign investment, as firms had no alternative if they wanted to secure supply.

Following the policy announcement, Huayou committed US$400 million to its lithium sulphate plant, while Sinomine announced a further US$500 million facility, showing that strategic metals such as lithium and cobalt gave African resource holders genuine leverage.

Lopes echoed this view, noting that export bans could improve investment quality by forcing long-term commitments over quick extraction cycles, provided states had the negotiating discipline to prevent smuggling and policy volatility.

“The continent now stands before a furnace: minerals can either harden industrial foundations or melt into another generation of externally driven accumulation,” he said.

Lauren Johnston, a China-Africa specialist and senior research fellow at the Melbourne-based AustChina Institute, said Zimbabwe’s close ties with China put it ahead in industrial partnerships. When evaluating the ban, Johnston framed the strategy around the price inelasticity of demand.

“Success depends on how dependent the buyer is on the raw material, how a de facto price increase affects the relationship and whether the buyer will simply find or develop alternatives,” she said.