Sudan Nashra: Ethiopia revokes Sudanese ambassador-designate’s credentials | Juba asks Cairo to evacuate military base near Ethiopian border as preemptive move | Another Mahamid field commander defects from RSF | RSF aid coordination authority orders agencies to register, Khartoum warns against compliance

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The fallout from Khartoum’s public escalation against Ethiopia over aerial attacks it said were launched from Ethiopian territory continued to unfold this week, with Addis Ababa taking retaliatory diplomatic measures and South Sudan moving to distance itself from the widening regional tensions surrounding the war in Sudan.

Days after a closed-door meeting — dismissed as being of “little political weight” by a former Sudanese diplomat —in Djibouti between Transitional Sovereignty Council Deputy Chair Malik Agar and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia sent what a source in the Foreign Ministry described as “strongly worded” letters revoking the accreditation of Sudan’s ambassador-designate to Addis Ababa.

The rupture follows last week’s drone attacks that Khartoum said it traced to Ethiopian territory, prompting Sudan to recall its acting ambassador from Addis Ababa. Senior Sudanese military sources told Mada Masr at the time that Khartoum’s future responses may go beyond interception operations and could include strikes on the platforms from which the attacks are launched.

Wary of the rapid deterioration in relations between its neighbors and the military implications it may carry, South Sudan moved quickly to avoid becoming entangled in the growing cross-border drone war.

A senior South Sudanese security official said Juba issued “definitive orders” to Egypt demanding the closure of its military base in the Jute-Pagak corridor in Upper Nile State.

The facility lies near the Sudan-Ethiopia-South Sudan border triangle and close to Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, home to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which has long been a source of tension between Addis Ababa and downstream countries Sudan and Egypt.

South Sudan fears becoming a “battleground for regional score-settling,” another security source said, adding that Juba does not want its territory or facilities to be viewed as being part of hostile operations against either Ethiopia or Sudan.

If implemented, the move would strip Egypt of a strategic foothold in the Nile Basin. A third senior security source said Juba is aware of the diplomatic sensitivity of the decision, but ultimately concluded that the risks posed by potential cross-border attacks outweighed the political costs.

As Sudan’s neighbors scramble to contain the ever-widening spillover of the war, both Khartoum and Nyala — the seat of the Rapid Support Forces-led Tasis administration in western Sudan — are locked in a parallel battle over who controls humanitarian access in a country collapsing under humanitarian catastrophe. 

The RSF’s National Authority for Humanitarian Access — established as a rival to Khartoum’s Humanitarian Aid Commission, the official body responsible for coordinating aid operations and liaising with international agencies — has ordered local and international organizations operating in areas under RSF control to register with it. 

A senior Tasis official told Mada Masr this week that the deadline was extended, framing the measure as administrative, while, in the same breath, warning that organizations refusing to comply could be suspended from operating in RSF-held territory.

A former Sudanese diplomat said the move is an attempt to force international actors into treating the RSF administration as a de facto authority, while a military source argued that the RSF is also trying to create a degree of protection from military airstrikes by tying its territories to aid operations.

Caught between the two sides, aid organizations face a difficult calculation. Registration with the RSF risks confrontation with Khartoum and possible expulsion, while refusal could cut off aid to millions of people in Darfur and Kordofan who are already suffering catastrophic shortages of food and medicine.

Meanwhile, Khartoum, is turning outward in search of political support as the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe continues to erode its domestic standing.

Prime Minister Kamel Idris arrived at the Vatican on Monday, where he met with Pope Leo XIV and senior Holy See officials in what a Sudanese political source described as an effort to draw on the Vatican’s symbolic influence to reinforce the government’s political image.

But critics say the outreach will ultimately go nowhere as long as the ruling military establishment remains committed to a military solution, at a time when Western governments and religious institutions are linking engagement to progress toward political negotiations.

On the battlefield, Blue Nile State bordering Ethiopia and South Sudan saw another round of territorial reversals this week.

In the Kurmuk locality, the military retook the Keili area on Saturday after losing it to the RSF in late April. Keili forms one of the main defensive lines protecting Kurmuk and sits along the strategic road connecting the town, near the border with Ethiopia, to Damazin, the capital of Blue Nile State.

But while the military regained ground in Kurmuk, it suffered a setback elsewhere after once again losing Magaja in the Bau locality to the RSF and the allied Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu.

As territorial control in Blue Nile continues to swing back and forth, the RSF lost another prominent field commander in Darfur this week when Ali “Savanna” Rizgallah announced his defection from the paramilitary group. 

Savanna had built a reputation as one of the most experienced desert commanders, known for maneuvering guerrilla units across some of the region’s harshest terrain. 

His departure comes at a particularly sensitive moment for the RSF, which is preparing for major confrontations in the Sudan-Egypt-Libya border triangle as the military attempts to open new routes toward Darfur.

Military sources told Mada Masr that the loss of a commander with Savanna’s experience — and the possible withdrawal of fighters loyal to him — could weaken the RSF’s position in the desert battles ahead.

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Ethiopia revokes Sudanese ambassador-designate’s credentials

A week after Khartoum accused Ethiopia of being involved in aerial attacks on Sudanese territory and withdrew its acting ambassador from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia took a retaliatory step on Tuesday, effectively rejecting Sudan’s ambassador-designate, Abdel Ghany al-Naeem, an informed Sudanese diplomatic source told Mada Masr.

According to the source, Sudan’s Foreign Ministry received two strongly worded letters through its embassy in Addis Ababa informing it that Ethiopia overturned its accreditation of Naeem, who had been preparing to leave his post in Senegal to assume his new assignment in Ethiopia.

Naeem had secured Ethiopian approval for the posting around three months earlier.

A source at the embassy in Addis Ababa said the mission had been overseen on an interim basis by Ambassador Al-Zein Ibrahim, before he was recalled to Sudan hours after the attacks on Khartoum International Airport — the incident that set off the current diplomatic rupture between the two countries.

Sudanese officials publicly claimed to possess “documented evidence” linking Addis Ababa and Abu Dhabi to the attacks, saying the drones used in the strikes belonged to the UAE and had taken off from Bahir Dar Airport in Ethiopia.

The accusations were followed days later by a closed-door meeting between Transitional Sovereignty Council Deputy Chair Malik Agar and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Djibouti during the May 8 ceremonies marking the inauguration of President Ismail Omar Guelleh.

A senior TSC source said Agar presented the Ethiopian side with “a comprehensive technical file” that demonstrated Ethiopian involvement.

But a former Sudanese diplomat dismissed the significance of the meeting, arguing that it “carried little political weight and produced no tangible commitments.”

The absence of TSC Chair Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the former diplomat said, signaled that “the head of state has moved beyond the stage of seeking soft understandings and reached the conclusion that political appeals are no longer effective.”

Diplomatic and military sources told Mada Masr last week that Khartoum is considering a broader escalation that could include taking Ethiopia before international forums, alongside more aggressive military responses to future attacks traced to Sudan’s eastern neighbor, including targeting the launch platforms.

Addis Ababa had quickly denied Sudan’s claims of its involvement, dismissing them as baseless, and countered with accusations of its own, saying the war in Sudan has spilled over into Ethiopian territory and undermined its national security.

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Juba asks Cairo to evacuate military base near Ethiopian border as preemptive move

South Sudan has asked Egypt to shut down its military base in the Jute-Pagak corridor in Upper Nile State over concerns that its territory could become the site of cross-border attacks as accusations of regional interference in the Sudan war continue to escalate, four security sources in Juba told Mada Masr.

A senior security official said that South Sudan’s military leadership issued “definitive orders” demanding the urgent closure of the facility and the suspension of all military activities linked to it.

If implemented, Egypt would lose a strategic foothold in the Nile Basin. 

As Khartoum and Addis Ababa accuse one another of facilitating military operations across their territories, South Sudanese officials are increasingly worried Juba could eventually face similar accusations or become vulnerable to retaliatory attacks, according to the sources. 

Those concerns emerged earlier this year in response to Sudanese intelligence reports that drones launched from Ethiopian territory had been used during the fighting in Blue Nile’s Kurmuk locality along the South Sudanese border, a senior source at Juba’s National Security Advisory Office and the third security source said.

According to the two sources, the reports raised alarm that the Jute-Pagak base itself could become a military target. The facility lies near the Sudan-Ethiopia-South Sudan border triangle and not far from Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, home to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam — a consistent source of tension between Addis Ababa and downstream countries Sudan and Egypt.

Juba therefore fears becoming a “battleground for regional score-settling,” the third security source said, adding that it is trying to maintain strict neutrality toward the conflicts surrounding it and does not want its territory or facilities to be viewed as supporting hostile operations against either Ethiopia or Sudan.

While diplomatically delicate, the senior source at the National Security Advisory Office said the decision was ultimately driven by the changing military realities, making the continued operation of the Egyptian base an increasing liability as regional powers compete for influence, resources and legitimacy.

The source added that the closure would bring to an end a phase that began in late 2020, when Egypt established its military presence under security arrangements aimed at strengthening strategic monitoring across the Nile Basin.

For nearly six years, the facility functioned as an advanced reconnaissance and technical coordination center. But developments since the beginning of this year — particularly the expansion of military operations into Sudan’s Blue Nile region — pushed Juba to reassess the national security risks of maintaining a foreign military presence on its territory, the source said.

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Blue Nile front sees new territorial reversals

This week brought another reshuffling of territorial control in Blue Nile State, with the military retaking the Keili area in Kurmuk locality, while the RSF and the allied SPLM-N regained control of Magaja in the Bau locality.

The military said troops from Damazin’s Fourth Infantry Division, backed by allied forces, recaptured Keili on Saturday after inflicting heavy losses on RSF and SPLM-N fighters.

The area had fallen to the RSF and forces under SPLM-N deputy chair Joseph Tuka on April 26. Keili serves as one of the main defensive lines for Kurmuk and lies along the strategic road linking Damazin, the capital of Blue Nile State, with the border town near Ethiopia.

A former military officer told Mada Masr that the recapture of Keili marks an important battlefield gain because of the area’s strategic position and its influence over troop movement, supply routes and operational control across southern Blue Nile.

According to the former officer, regaining control of the area restricts RSF mobility and forces its fighters to rely increasingly on rugged terrain for maneuvering and resupply operations.

A field source in the military said troops moved quickly to consolidate control over Keili by deploying reinforcements, military vehicles and advanced defensive positions.

The source added that military drones carried out strikes on Monday and Tuesday targeting RSF and SPLM-N positions in Kurmuk.

But while the military advanced in Keili, it suffered a setback elsewhere in Blue Nile, after RSF and SPLM-N fighters recaptured Magaja in the Bau locality on Wednesday, according to a field source affiliated with the SPLM-N.

Control of Magaja has repeatedly shifted in recent weeks. The military had only regained the area in late April after losing it shortly following the fall of Kurmuk in March.

The area serves as a defensive position for both Damazin and Kurmuk, and its capture allows RSF and SPLM-N forces to pressure military positions in Dandoro and Sali.

The SPLM-N source said their forces killed and captured several military soldiers and officers during the operation and seized military vehicles and equipment.

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Another Mahamid field commander defects from RSF

RSF commander Ali “Savanna” Rizgallah announced his defection from the paramilitary group in a video posted on social media on Monday, becoming the second prominent commander from the Mahamid tribe to break with the RSF in recent weeks.

His departure comes only weeks after Al-Nour Gubba — an influential Mahamid commander with strong tribal ties across Darfur — defected and aligned himself and his fighters with the military. Savanna, however, stressed in his video statement that he has not joined any other armed faction, saying he “defected to the will of the Sudanese people” instead. 

Like Gubba, Savanna previously served under Mahamid tribal leader Musa Hilal in the Border Guards group formed and backed by ousted President Omar al-Bashir. In 2017, the RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, stormed Mostariha, Hilal’s stronghold in North Darfur, after Bashir replaced Hilal with Hemedti and the Border Guards were integrated into the RSF.

Savanna was among those who protested the integration and rebelled against the government before being captured in a military operation in Darfur and imprisoned for several years.

He later joined the RSF after the war broke out in 2023.

According to a source close to Savanna, the commander’s final break with the RSF was driven largely by the group’s deadly raid on Mostariha in late February, following weeks of escalating tensions between the RSF leadership and Hilal, the military-aligned head of the Revolutionary Awakening Council.

The source said Savanna saw the attack, which was marked by abuses, as having breached tribal red lines, threatening the cohesion of Mahamid communities in Darfur.

A security source in the Revolutionary Awakening Council said mistrust between Savanna and the RSF leadership had already been building, particularly in relation to Deputy Commander Abdel Rahim Dagalo.

Disagreements over military strategy, political direction and the growing marginalization of veteran field commanders had fueled tensions inside the group, as authority became increasingly concentrated among a narrow circle close to the Dagalo family, the source said.

The situation worsened about a week ago, when Hemedti announced the formation of a “new leadership body” as part of a broader reorganization of the RSF. According to the source, many field commanders interpreted the move as an effort to centralize authority in Nyala and weaken other power centers within the group.

Widely regarded as one of Darfur’s most controversial commanders, Savanna built his influence through a succession of alliances. What consistently distinguished him, a former military officer said, was his command of desert warfare and his ability to move experienced guerrilla units across some of the region’s harshest terrain.

During the war, Savanna became a key figure in securing RSF supply routes through the desert, especially across the Sudan-Egypt-Libya border triangle after the paramilitary group seized the area in June, the source added.

Together, Savanna and Gubba had formed an important part of the RSF’s mobilization and operations in Darfur. Now, as the military prepares for a major confrontation in the Sudan-Egypt-Libya border triangle in an attempt to open new routes toward Darfur, Gubba and Savanna’s departures are expected to have immediate operational consequences. 

The former military officer and a field source told Mada Masr that Savanna’s forces had effectively served as the first line of defense in the desert border region. Their potential withdrawal, the sources said, could disrupt advanced operations rooms that relied heavily on fighters with extensive experience in desert guerrilla warfare.

The former officer added that losing those networks would expose strategic corridors linking Darfur to Libya and Chad, reducing the RSF’s ability to maneuver across open desert and increasing the vulnerability of its supply convoys to ambushes by defecting groups with intimate knowledge of the region’s terrain.

The source added that the RSF may also effectively lose control over remote desert staging areas used for redeployment and logistical coordination.

That, in turn, could force the RSF leadership to divert fighters away from active battlefronts in order to secure its rear positions — a costly shift at a time when the group is already under growing pressure along the Tina front near Chad and other frontlines, according to the source.

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RSF’s parallel aid coordination authority orders agencies to register, Khartoum warns against compliance

The RSF-led government’s National Authority for Humanitarian Access — the parallel body to Khartoum’s Humanitarian Aid Commission — said on Wednesday it would extend the deadline it had imposed on international and local aid organizations to register with it and become licensed to deliver aid in areas under RSF control.

The announcement follows directives issued in mid-April by the RSF-led Tasis administration in western Sudan ordering aid agencies to register with the authority within 30 days. United Nations agencies were also instructed to sign technical agreements and reopen offices in RSF-controlled areas within 45 days.

The authority warned that organizations that fail to comply could lose entry approvals and be banned from operating in its territories, which span Darfur and large parts of Kordofan.

The two regions have become epicenters of Sudan’s humanitarian crisis, where severe shortages of food and life-saving medicine are deepening as ongoing fighting traps people in repeated cycles of displacement.

Last week, in the wake of the Tasis ultimatum, Sudan’s Foreign Ministry summoned senior UN officials, including Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator Denise Brown, to warn against engaging with the Tasis aid coordination authority or complying with its demands.

Meanwhile, the Tasis administration sought to portray itself as a functioning alternative government capable of managing humanitarian access and ensuring the safety of aid operations. On May 5, its prime minister, Mohamed Hassan al-Taaishy, said his administration was ready to negotiate truce arrangements to facilitate aid delivery across Sudan. He added that the administration had finalized its executive and legislative structures, including appointing ministers and deputy ministers responsible for restoring services in RSF-held territories.

A former diplomat described the measures as “an attempt to extract international recognition through the imposition of a fait accompli.”

“The RSF understands that military control alone does not confer legitimacy,” the source said. “By requiring organizations to register with its own agency, it is attempting to pressure UN bodies into signing agreements that would effectively treat the RSF administration as a legally recognized authority.”

A former official at Sudan’s Humanitarian Aid Commission, the state body responsible for coordinating humanitarian work and liaising with international aid agencies, said relief operations are now entering an increasingly precarious phase.

“International organizations now find themselves trapped between directives issued by the Foreign Ministry and the realities on the ground in Darfur,” the former official said. “Complying with RSF demands to register with its agency would, in practice, amount to recognizing a parallel administration, putting those organizations on a collision course with the central government and potentially exposing them to expulsion. But refusing to comply could deprive millions of people of food and medicine — and that is precisely the leverage the RSF is attempting to use to impose itself as the sole authority capable of managing the administrative landscape in the states under its control.”

Khartoum has a history of turning against humanitarian organizations. In November 2025, it declared the World Food Programme’s country director and head of operations personas non grata. According to a source at the prime minister’s office who spoke to Mada Masr at the time, the decision stemmed from mounting frustration within the TSC after WFP aid convoys were permitted entry through the Adre crossing from Chad as military operations targeting RSF smuggling routes were ongoing. 

Sudanese authorities have repeatedly accused the RSF of using Adre to transport arms and ammunition.

The crossing — effectively the last major route through which humanitarian aid can reach millions of people in Darfur and Kordofan — was closed in late February to commercial traffic and civilian movement alongside other borders with Chad following repeated cross-border attacks on Chadian territories. It remained partially open for limited humanitarian deliveries under arrangements overseen by Chadian authorities.

Beyond the political dimensions of the Tasis initiative, a former senior military officer argued that the move is also intended to serve immediate military objectives. 

“Taaishy’s proposal for a humanitarian truce is, above all, a military tactic intended to contain the damage caused by concentrated military airstrikes targeting supply lines and strategic sites in Nyala,” they said. “Calls for humanitarian facilitation and safe corridors are, in practice, an attempt to establish partial no-fly zones that would shield the newly established institutions while allowing the RSF to regroup and train under the cover of humanitarian operations.”

Airstrikes by the military have continued to heavily pound key RSF-held cities across Darfur, especially Nyala, the seat of the parallel government. Over the course of this week alone, the military launched repeated drone strikes on RSF positions in Nyala, alongside sites in West Darfur’s Geneina and East Darfur’s Daein, a military source told Mada Masr.

Three residents of Nyala said they heard successive explosions across different parts of Nyala Monday through Wednesday.

The RSF has relied on major cities as hubs for provisioning and logistics, making them a constant target of the military’s aerial campaigns.

The Tasis administration defended its policies as necessary for governing territories under its control. A senior Tasis official told Mada Masr that the establishment of executive and legislative institutions created “a legal and moral obligation to regulate humanitarian operations.”

The official added that requiring organizations to register with the National Authority for Humanitarian Access “is not a political objective, but an administrative measure aimed at ensuring aid reaches those entitled to it under the supervision of an authority capable of securing humanitarian corridors and markets.”

Any organization that refuses to comply, they added, “is effectively choosing to abandon those affected for political reasons dictated by Port Sudan.” The official warned that the administration would be compelled to take “strict measures,” including suspending the operations of non-compliant groups in RSF-held areas.

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Dozens killed in South Kordofan villages as SPLM-N clashes with Otoro tribe escalate

More than 60 people, including nine children and five women, were killed in Kauda in South Kordofan in what the Sudan Doctors Network described as ethnically motivated violence linked to clashes between SPLM-N forces and the Otoro tribe.

In a statement issued Wednesday, the network expressed “deep concern regarding reports and consistent testimonies from survivors in Kauda and surrounding areas” of a dangerous escalation of abuses against civilians over the past two weeks, including “extrajudicial killings, slaughtering, burning of homes and shops, as well as widespread looting” by SPLM-N forces.

Kauda is the main stronghold of the SPLM-N leadership in the Nuba Mountains region of South Kordofan.

The movement said in a May 8 statement that it launched attacks on areas inhabited by the Otoro tribe while pursuing “rebels.”

The roots of the crisis date back to 2022, when the SPLM-N sought to restructure the region’s traditional administration through a conference held in Heiban in the Nuba Mountains. The initiative was intended to resolve historical disputes over land ownership and the distribution of hawakir, or tribal landholdings, among local communities.

The conference introduced plans to demarcate administrative boundaries and replace borders traditionally defined by natural landmarks with fixed concrete markers. Many members of the Otoro tribe regarded the move as an infringement on their ancestral lands and a threat to their traditional sovereignty. Otoro groups subsequently organized efforts to dismantle the markers soon after they were installed.

Over time, the dispute spilled into the SPLM-N’s own military ranks, where loyalties overlap with tribal affiliations. By 2025, officers and soldiers from the Otoro tribe found themselves torn between obeying orders to enforce the demarcation process and siding with their community, which rejected the decision.

Tensions escalated in March 2026 into mass refusals to carry out military orders. The SPLM-N leadership treated the move as an outright mutiny threatening the movement’s chain of command.

The standoff evolved into armed confrontation in May, when the General Staff in Kauda moved to disarm dissenting groups and subdue Otoro leaders. Dissident officers responded by entrenching themselves in their tribal areas, backed by strong local support

The violence eventually spread across villages surrounding Kauda, leaving dozens dead and large areas destroyed.

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Idris in Vatican as Sudan turns to religious diplomacy

In an official visit to the Vatican on Monday, Prime Minister Kamel Idris held talks with Pope Leo XIV and senior Vatican officials.

According to the Sudan News Agency, discussions focused on “the importance of strengthening humanitarian cooperation with international and ecclesiastical institutions and expanding international support for the Sudanese people.”

The Holy See press office said the meetings underscored “the urgent need to achieve a ceasefire, provide assistance to the population and initiate a sincere dialogue among all parties of the Sudanese nation.”

The visit comes as Sudanese authorities seek to leverage religious diplomacy and humanitarian engagement to bolster their international standing amid growing scrutiny over the war and the country’s deepening humanitarian crisis.

But critics who spoke to Mada Masr say the outreach will ultimately go nowhere as long as the ruling military establishment remains committed to a military solution, at a time when Western governments and religious institutions are linking engagement to progress on political negotiations.

Orwa al-Sadig, the assistant chair of the National Umma Party, described the visit as an attempt by Khartoum to gain “moral legitimacy” and humanitarian-diplomatic cover. He said the government is seeking to benefit from the Vatican’s spiritual influence to bolster its political image rather than pursue a serious initiative to change the situation on the ground. 

According to Sadig, Idris merely operates as a political front while decisions on war and peace remain in the hands of a hardline military and ideological establishment. As long as the real centers of power continue to view military escalation as essential to their survival, he said, the Vatican’s capacity to exert “soft” pressure will likely remain limited. 

Political and Horn of Africa affairs researcher Fouad Othman said Idris’s visit forms part of a broader political and diplomatic campaign aimed at rebuilding authorities’ legitimacy abroad after it was eroded domestically by the humanitarian crisis and widespread destruction caused by the war.

Othman pointed to a series of steps taken by Khartoum in recent months, beginning with Burhan’s visits to churches in Khartoum in January, which he described as a domestic message to convey the state’s commitment to religious diversity and the protection of places of worship during the war. 

The move was reinforced by diplomatic outreach led by Burhan’s advisor, Amgad Farid, in Washington in February and March. According to Othman, Farid’s meetings with policymakers and religious freedom organizations focused on promoting a government narrative that presented “the protection of minorities and coexistence” as central to the government’s struggle for legitimacy “against rebel forces.”

Othman argued, however, that the fundamental flaw in this discourse lies in its failure to acknowledge that the continuation of the war — regardless of which side is responsible — represents in the eyes of the world the greatest threat to Sudan’s social fabric and the future of the state itself.

Condemnation of RSF violations by some European governments should not be misinterpreted as political backing for the continuation of the war or full alignment with the government’s narrative, the researcher added. Western powers, he said, remain primarily concerned with preventing the collapse of the Sudanese state and containing the worsening humanitarian crisis.

He stressed that even European positions that at times appear more aligned with the military’s rhetoric ultimately converge around the same principles: rejecting a military solution, calling for the protection of civilians and supporting a negotiated process to end the war.

Othman concluded that any meaningful political breakthrough with European actors would remain contingent on demonstrating a genuine commitment to ending the fighting and engaging in a comprehensive political process.

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Burhan in brief visit to Manama as part of Gulf tour

TSC Chair Abdel Fattah al-Burhan landed in Bahrain on Wednesday for a short visit, adding another stop to his recent Gulf tour.

He was received by King Hamad bin Issa Al-Khalifa at Sakhir Air Base before the two held closed-door talks on Sudan’s war, regional developments and bilateral relations, a Sudanese diplomatic source said.

A second informed diplomatic source said discussions revolved around political and security coordination in the Red Sea to secure maritime shipping lanes, while affirming Sudan’s support for a unified Gulf stance against Iran. The source added that Burhan avoided discussing tensions with the United Arab Emirates during the visit as a gesture of solidarity with the Gulf position.

The first diplomatic source described the visit as part of a broader Gulf strategy pursued by Burhan in recent weeks to shore up Arab political backing for Sudan’s state institutions, while countering any efforts to grant legitimacy to the RSF’s rival administration in western Sudan.

In Jeddah last month, Burhan met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman in talks focused largely on securing Riyadh’s support against efforts to bypass the Sudanese government in the administration of humanitarian aid. The following day, he touched down in Muscat to consolidate the shift toward Omani ports after the UAE imposed bans last year on vessels bound for Sudanese ports, as Khartoum tries to diversify trade lines to reduce reliance on routes increasingly susceptible to regional upheavals.

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The post Sudan Nashra: Ethiopia revokes Sudanese ambassador-designate’s credentials | Juba asks Cairo to evacuate military base near Ethiopian border as preemptive move | Another Mahamid field commander defects from RSF | RSF aid coordination authority orders agencies to register, Khartoum warns against compliance first appeared on Mada Masr.

المصدر: Mada Masr